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REFRAMING THE PUNISHMENT TEST THROUGH
MODERN SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION
Jane Ramage*
Modern sex offender registration and notification laws blur the distinction
between criminal and civil law. Despite being labeled as civil regulatory
schemes, these laws impose severe burdens on personal liberty—burdens
that we tend to associate with criminal punishment. In 2003, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that at least one sex offender registration and
notification program functioned as a civil remedy rather than a criminal
sanction. In upholding the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, the
Supreme Court held that the burdens imposed by the statute did not impose
additional punishment on registered sex offenders and thus did not trigger
the constitutional protections reserved for criminal defendants.
As sex offender legislation has grown in scope and severity, federal courts
have continued to reject challenges brought by registered sex offenders who
allege that these programs impose additional punishment. In 2016, however,
the Sixth Circuit broke new ground and determined that the requirements set
forth in the amendments to the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act had
transformed the scheme from civil to criminal. This Note explores the
growing circuit split among federal courts in assessing the nature of sex
offender legislation and proposes that courts reframe the current punishment
analysis to resolve these inconsistencies.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1979, six-year-old Etan Patz was abducted while walking to his school
bus stop two blocks from his home in New York City.1 In 1981, six-yearold Adam Walsh was kidnapped and murdered after he was abducted from a
shopping mall in Florida.2 In 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was
abducted by a masked gunman while riding his bike in St. Joseph,
Minnesota.3 In 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was raped and murdered
by her neighbor in Hamilton Township, New Jersey.4 The common thread
that connected these four brutal tragedies was the public belief that the
perpetrator in each case had harmed children before.5
The brutality of the crimes committed against Etan, Adam, Jacob, and
Megan, coupled with the possibility that the childrens’ suffering could have
been prevented, mobilized both activists and legislators to demand change.6
In response to growing public outrage and political pressure, Congress
passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act7 (the “Wetterling Act”) and Megan’s Law.8

1. Rick Rojas, What Happened to Etan Patz?: Unraveling a Nearly 40-Year-Old Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/nyregion/what-happenedto-etan-patz.html [https://perma.cc/82FP-LDVK].
2. Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Ackerman, A Brief History of Major Sex Offender Laws,
in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 50, 58 (Richard G. Wright ed.,
2d ed. 2015).
3. Id. at 57.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 57–58.
6. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION 44 (2017).
7. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (repealed 2006).
8. Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (repealed 2006).
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Together, these laws required states to implement registration and
notification programs to monitor convicted “sex offenders.”9
To comply with the federal requirements, states were obligated to collect
and manage personal information from people qualifying as sex offenders
under the statute and disclose the presence of registrants10 to members of the
community.11 Inherent in the political discourse supporting sex offender
legislation was the notion that parents should have the right to know if their
neighbors pose a danger to their children.12 By compiling registrants’
information and notifying community members of their presence, Congress
and compliant states sought to provide comfort to parents and prevent future
crimes against children.13
Following the implementation of sex offender registration and notification
(SORN) programs in the states, registrants began to challenge the schemes
as additional forms of criminal punishment in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.14 In 2003,15 the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe16 upheld
Alaska’s SORN law on the grounds that it did not, expressly or in effect,
punish those subject to its requirements.17 This Note will refer to the state
laws challenged prior to Smith and the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith as
“first-generation” SORN laws.
In the years following the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress and state
legislatures amended existing SORN programs by increasing registration
requirements and expanding the scope of community notification.18 With the
growth of sex offender legislation, registrants launched a second round of
challenges, alleging that the more burdensome and expansive laws were
distinguishable from first-generation laws and had become criminal in
nature.19 This Note will refer to these amendments as “modern” SORN laws.
Until 2016, it appeared that any challenges brought against both firstgeneration and modern SORN laws were foreclosed by Smith, no matter how
dissimilar they were to the original Alaskan statute considered by the Court.20
Almost universally, federal courts rejected arguments brought by registrants

9. See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 55–56 (2009).
10. This Note will refer to persons required to register as sex offenders in their respective
federal, state, and local jurisdictions as “registrants.”
11. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 43–44.
12. See 140 CONG. REC. 21,557 (1994) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Had Megan’s grieving
parents known that their neighbor was a dangerous person, they would have taken steps to
protect their precious child. Megan’s parents had a right to know.”); 140 CONG. REC. 19,545
(1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (“The families in these communities and these innocent
victims had a right to know that dangerous sexual predators were in their midst.”).
13. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 56.
14. See infra Part II.B.1.
15. See infra Part II.B.1.
16. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
17. Id. at 85.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.A.
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based on the same justification used by the Supreme Court in Smith—SORN
laws are civil in nature.21
In 2016, however, the Sixth Circuit approached the punishment question
differently.22 In its unprecedented decision Does #1–5 v. Snyder,23 the Sixth
Circuit determined that SORN regimes can impose additional forms of
punishment through broad and overly burdensome provisions.24 Paving a
new course for federal courts, the Sixth Circuit drew a distinction between
the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith and modern SORN laws.25 Today, a
minority of federal courts have followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead in
determining that some modern SORN programs go too far and function to
punish sex offenders in their pursuit of safety.26
This Note explores the emerging circuit split by analyzing how federal
courts have inconsistently interpreted Smith and unpredictably applied the
Court’s analysis to modern SORN laws. Part I provides a brief explanation
of the criminal-civil distinction and the constitutional implications of the
criminal designation. Part II examines the history of SORN laws by looking
at first-generation programs and modern regimes and the constitutional
challenges raised in response to both. Part III explores the circuit split
stemming from the varied applications of the relevant punishment analysis.
Part IV proposes alterations to the current test that could resolve the
inconsistencies among federal courts and preserve the constitutional
protections afforded to criminal defendants.
I. THE PUNISHMENT QUESTION
Sex offender registration and notification schemes are frequently
challenged as forms of criminal punishment in violation of the constitutional
provisions that protect criminal defendants.27 Before addressing these
challenges, this Note explores the distinctions between criminal and civil law
and the constitutional repercussions of that divide. Part I.A explores the
differences between criminal penalties and civil remedies and how the
dichotomous relationship between the two types of sanctions can be difficult
to preserve. Part I.B outlines the test devised by the Supreme Court to
determine whether a measure is considered a civil remedy or a criminal
penalty. Part I.C explains why the criminal and civil labels matter by
analyzing the constitutional protections reserved only for criminal
defendants.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Parts II.B, III.
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A. The Criminal-Civil Distinction
Criminal and civil law are traditionally understood as two distinct areas of
law within the American legal system.28 Law students are taught to take this
dichotomy for granted, as the law school curriculum is divided neatly into
criminal and civil categories.29 After all, the two areas of law utilize different
courts, rules of procedure, burdens of proof, rules of discovery, and
investigatory practices.30
The division between criminal and civil law is further emphasized by
distinct categories of sanctions.31 Criminal law subjects wrongdoers to
“criminal penalties,” which traditionally include arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration.32 Civil law, alternatively, subjects wrongdoers to “civil
remedies,” such as injunctive relief, monetary damages, and specific
performance.33 These conventional paradigms stem from the belief that the
purposes of the two areas of the law are, or should be, different: criminal law
is supposed to punish and civil law is supposed to compensate.34 Despite
this traditional distinction, however, laws frequently function to accomplish
both aims.35
In achieving both purposes, some sanctions may appear to function as both
criminal penalties and civil remedies. But the division of laws into one of
these two categories remains a threshold matter of constitutional
importance.36 Thus, the Supreme Court has determined that where a law is
labeled a civil remedy but functions to punish wrongdoers, the law must be
given a criminal designation.37 The process of determining whether a statute

28. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1988) (“The States have long been able
to plan their own procedures around the traditional distinction between civil and criminal
remedies.”); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991) (“[T]his basic division has been a hallmark
of English and American jurisprudence for hundreds of years.”).
29. Cheh, supra note 28, at 1325.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1332–33.
32. Id.; Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1803–04 (1992).
33. See Cheh, supra note 28, at 1333.
34. Mann, supra note 32, at 1796; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (“If the
statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand the
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.—it has been considered penal. But a statute has been
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose.”).
35. See Mann, supra note 32, at 1797–98; Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment:
The Supreme Court’s Ongoing Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil
Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 517–19 (1997); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 447 (1989) (“It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as
well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served
by criminal penalties.”).
36. See infra Part I.C.
37. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In light of this holding, this
Note uses the words “criminal,” “punitive,” and “penal” interchangeably. This Note also uses
the words “civil,” “regulatory,” and “nonpunitive” interchangeably.
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imposes such a punishment, transforming it from a civil remedy to a criminal
penalty, has been termed the “punishment question.”38
Using the concept of punishment to demarcate the criminal-civil divide
has proven to be more challenging than the seemingly dichotomous legal
world would tend to suggest. First, punishment is “an imprecise concept with
meanings that vary depending on the purpose for which the concept is
defined.”39 As illustrative of this imprecision, Merriam-Webster defines
“punishment” as “the act of punishing”40 and “to punish” as “to impose a
penalty on for a fault, offense, or violation.”41 Second, the Court itself has
acknowledged that punishment plays a role in both civil and criminal law. In
United States v. Halper,42 the Court recognized that the “notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between
the civil and the criminal law.”43
Answering the punishment question has been further complicated by the
Court’s borderline “unintelligible” case law on the issue.44 In determining
whether a sanction is civil or criminal, the Court has devised several,
sometimes inconsistent, tests.45 For example, in one variation of the
punishment test, Justice Felix Frankfurter looked solely at the expressed
intent of Congress in enacting a statute that withheld salaries of certain
government employees.46 Reasoning that “presumed motive cannot supplant
expressed legislative judgment,” Justice Frankfurter concluded that the
statute was not punitive because Congress had excluded “any condemnation
for which the presumed punishment was a sanction.”47 In another
formulation, the Court applied the “rational relation” test to the termination
of social security benefits of an immigrant deported for membership in the
Communist Party.48 Under this approach, the Court determined that the
sanction was nonpunitive because the termination bore a “rational connection
to the purposes of the legislation of which it is a part.”49

38. Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1280 (1998).
39. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2d Cir. 1997).
40. Punishment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
punishment [https://perma.cc/ML72-UR2B] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
41. Punish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punish
[https://perma.cc/KXL2-R9YM] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
42. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
43. Id. at 448.
44. Logan, supra note 38, at 1280.
45. Id. at 1281. Compare Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100–02 (1997) (holding
that a sanction is not punitive solely because it furthers a traditional aim of punishment), with
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448–49 (holding that a sanction is punitive where it serves the traditional
aims of punishment including retribution and deterrence).
46. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 325–26 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also Maria Foscarinis, Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1671 (1980).
47. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 326.
48. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 605 (1960); see also Foscarinis, supra note
46, at 1673–74.
49. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 617.
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Applying different variations of the punishment test, the Court has
determined that the revocation of citizenship50 and the extension of
incarceration51 both constitute forms of punishment, while the revocation of
a medical license,52 prohibition of work as a union official,53 termination of
social security benefits,54 and involuntary confinement of certain sex
offenders are not forms of punishment.55 Given the confusion surrounding
the proper punishment analysis, lower courts frequently attempted to
demarcate the parameters of punishment by comparing the sanction before
them to ones previously addressed by the Court.56
B. Answering the Punishment Question
Despite the Supreme Court’s historical inconsistency in applying a
standard punishment test, modern Court decisions that consider the
punishment question regularly rely on a two-part analysis called the “intenteffects test.”57 The first step of the test, originally articulated in United States
v. Ward,58 requires a court to ascertain the legislature’s explicit or implicit
preference to designate the law as civil or criminal.59 The second step of the
analysis, which is only necessary where the legislature intends for the law to
be civil,60 requires the court to determine whether the sanction is punitive in
its effects on those subject to it.61
To determine a legislature’s intention, a court considers the text and
structure of the statute authorizing the sanction.62 The location of a law’s
codification in a civil or criminal code63 and even the title of the statute can
be helpful in ascertaining intent64 but are not alone dispositive.65 Instead, the
50. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
51. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 434–35 (1987).
52. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898).
53. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960).
54. See Nestor, 363 U.S. at 619.
55. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997).
56. See E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1101 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The only examples the
case law suggests of effects sufficiently onerous are deprivation of one’s United States
citizenship that leaves one a ‘stateless person’ and a complete deprivation of personal freedom
(i.e., incarceration).”); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1266 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The
caselaw does not tell us where the line falls that divides permissible from impermissible
effects, but we know the ‘matter of degree’ is somewhere between imprisonment and
revocation of citizenship on the one hand, and loss of a profession or benefits on the other.”).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262
(2001); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361–65; United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277–78 (1996).
58. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
59. Id. at 248.
60. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
61. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
62. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (“The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil
or criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory construction.’” (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 368 (1986))).
63. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 94–95; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
64. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996).
65. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 94.
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court must determine whether the legislature, “in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label
or the other.”66 If the court determines that the legislature intended to impose
punishment, its analysis is complete and the law is criminal.67 If, instead, the
court determines that the legislature intended the law to be civil, it will then
consider whether the law is so punitive in its effects as to negate the
legislature’s preference.68
The second step of the analysis involves a high degree of deference to the
legislature’s purported intent.69 The court will only reject the government’s
intention if the party challenging the statute provides “the clearest proof” that
the statutory scheme functions as a punitive sanction.70 Without conclusive
evidence that the law is punitive, the court must answer the punishment
question in the negative.71
To ascertain whether a measure’s effects function to punish, the court
considers seven factors originally compiled in Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez72 that are commonly referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors.73
The factors include: (1) whether the sanction affirmatively disables or
restrains those subject to it; (2) whether the sanction has been historically
regarded as a punishment; (3) whether the sanction was imposed only on a
finding of scienter; (4) whether the sanction’s operation promotes the
traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the
behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crime; (6) whether the
sanction has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; and (7) whether
the sanction appears excessive in relation to the nonpunitive purpose.74
Although the factors are intended to serve as helpful guideposts in the effects
analysis, the Supreme Court has warned that they are “neither exhaustive nor
dispositive.”75

66. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
67. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
68. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49).
71. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (noting that “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override
legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty” (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997))).
72. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
73. See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
74. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69.
75. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). Because the Mendoza-Martinez
factors can be manipulated or disregarded, they are frequently criticized as virtually
meaningless. Logan, supra note 38, at 1282; see Smith, 538 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (describing the effects test as one of the multifactor tests that
the U.S. Supreme Court “manipulate[s]” in “wholly dissimilar cases”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 565 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that the Court’s reformulation of the
test “lacks any real content”).
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C. The Constitutional Implications of the Answer
A court’s answer to the punishment question has significant legal
consequences for those subject to the relevant sanction.76 When a court
determines that a law functions as a criminal penalty, the law must comply
with the constitutional protections reserved for criminal defendants.77 The
U.S. Constitution explicitly protects persons in a “criminal case” from selfincrimination78 and reserves for criminal defendants the rights to a speedy
trial, impartial jury, defense counsel, and confrontation.79 Additionally, the
Court has interpreted other constitutional protections as triggered exclusively
in the criminal context such as the rights found in the Double Jeopardy
Clause,80 the Excessive Fines Clause,81 the Bill of Attainder Clause,82 the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,83 and the Ex Post Facto Clause.84
The constitutional protections afforded in criminal cases make the effects
analysis of the punishment test particularly important.85 Given the
procedural and substantive rights that are reserved solely for criminal
defendants, penal sanctions undoubtedly impose greater costs than civil
remedies.86 These additional costs may create incentives for legislatures to
avoid enacting “criminal sanctions.”87 As a result, there exists the possibility
that legislatures may structure punitive measures as civil remedies to avoid
paying such costs.88 Chief Justice Earl Warren expressed caution about
blindly following the labels provided by legislatures, stating, “[h]ow simple
would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if

76. See Logan, supra note 38, at 1280.
77. See Porter, supra note 35, at 518.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. Id. amend. VI.
80. Id. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398–99 (1938)
(“Unless this sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially
criminal, the double jeopardy clause provided for the defendant in criminal prosecutions is not
applicable.”).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993)
(“[T]he question is not . . . whether forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is
punishment.”).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 447 (1965) (“[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause . . . was instead to be read in light of the evil
the Framers had sought to bar: legislative punishment.”).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“While the
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards.”).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.
37, 41 (1990) (“Although the Latin phrase ‘ex post facto’ literally encompasses any law passed
‘after the fact,’ it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on
ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by
them.”).
85. See Logan, supra note 38, at 1288.
86. Id. at 1289.
87. Id. at 1288–89.
88. Id.
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specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on
them!”89
II. THE RISE OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION
SCHEMES
Since the inception of registration and notification programs, opponents of
sex offender legislation have argued that the regimes function as criminal
penalties despite their civil labels. Part II.A provides a brief history of firstgeneration federal, state, and local SORN schemes. Part II.B explores the
initial judicial challenges brought against these laws as punitive measures in
violation of the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants.
Part II.C outlines the more expansive modern federal, state, and local SORN
laws enacted after the Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe.
A. First-Generation SORN Laws
Following a series of high-profile child abductions and murders in the
1980s and 1990s,90 state legislatures began to implement registration and
notification systems in an attempt to monitor sex offenders.91 In the
aftermath of these murders, described as “hysteria,”92 the public formed the
belief that in all of these crimes “the person who did it had a sexual motive.”93
And in response, the government’s message was clear: “if you dare to prey
on our children, the law will follow you wherever you go, state to state, town
to town.”94
Inspired by state programs and growing public outrage,95 Congress passed
the Wetterling Act in 1994.96 The Wetterling Act required each state to
create a sex offender registry97 and outlined the minimum standards for
implementation of the registration programs.98 To encourage widespread
adoption, Congress conditioned 10 percent of states’ federal funding for
criminal justice programs on compliance with the statute’s requirements.99

89. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958).
90. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 49–54.
91. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 50.
92. In the Dark:
S1 E6; Stranger Danger, APM REP. 6:50–7:22, https://
www.apmreports.org/story/2016/10/04/in-the-dark-6 [https://perma.cc/9WDT-2XCK] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019).
93. Id.
94. Clintonlibrary42, President Clinton Signing Megan’s Law, YOUTUBE (Nov. 1, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Nfp__K9s2M [https://perma.cc/8RH5-9HM6].
95. See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND
THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 14–16 (2006).
96. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (repealed 2006).
97. Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 57.
98. See Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 575 (Jan. 5,
1999) (instructing the states to interpret the Wetterling Act as “a floor for state programs, not
a ceiling”).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f) (repealed 2006); see LOGAN, supra note 9, at 58.
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The Wetterling Act applied to persons (1) convicted of certain crimes
against minors,100 (2) convicted of a “sexually violent offense,”101 or (3)
designated a “sexually violent predator.”102 A “sexually violent predator”
was defined in the statute as a person “convicted of a sexually violent offense
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.”103
Persons convicted of specified crimes against minors or sexually violent
offenses were required to register for ten years.104 Alternatively, persons
designated as sexually violent predators were required to register until the
sentencing court determined that the registrant no longer met the
designation’s definition.105 The Wetterling Act further mandated that states
impose a criminal penalty on registrants who knowingly failed to register,
but it did not specify the degree of such penalty.106
In 1996, Congress passed Megan’s Law in response to criticism that the
implemented registration programs had not gone far enough.107 Megan’s
Law amended the Wetterling Act to require—rather than permit—
community notification of registration information.108 Despite this direction
from Congress, states retained discretion over which registrants were subject
to community notification and how to disseminate their information.109
Congress supplemented the federal registration and notification
requirements with the enactment of the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender
Tracking and Identification Act of 1996110 (the “Lychner Act”). The
Lychner Act established a federal database of sex offenders, which was to be
operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and made available to
state officials.111 This central database was intended to facilitate information
100. § 14071(a)(3)(A). Offenses included “(i) kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent;
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent; (iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a
minor; (iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct; (v) use of a minor in a sexual
performance; (vi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; (vii) any conduct that by its
nature is a sexual offense against a minor; or (viii) an attempt to commit an offense described
in any of [the] clauses.” Id.
101. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B). Offenses included aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or
“an offense that has as its elements engaging in physical contact with another person with
intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse.” Id.
102. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A).
105. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(B).
106. Id. § 14071(c).
107. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 58; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 57. When
President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law, he remarked: “From now on, every State in the
country will be required by law to tell a community when a dangerous sexual predator enters
its midst. We respect people’s rights, but today America proclaims there is no greater right
than a parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love.” Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law
and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 763 (May 17, 1996).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (amending the language of the law to read “shall” instead of
“may”); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past,
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2008).
109. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 61.
110. Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (repealed 2006).
111. Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 58.
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sharing among states in order to effectively monitor registrants traveling
across state lines.112 Unlike the Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law, which
relied on states to implement the provisions, the Lychner Act authorized the
FBI to register applicable sex offenders and disclose registration information
necessary to protect the public.113 Thus, the Lychner Act allowed the federal
government to circumvent noncompliant states by requiring registrants
residing in states that had not yet established a “minimally sufficient” SORN
program to register in the national database.114
The Lychner Act also included new categories of registrants that were
required to register for life.115 In addition to persons determined to be
sexually violent predators,116 the Lychner Act required persons convicted of
two or more of the specified crimes against minors or sexually violent
offenses117 and persons convicted of aggravated sexual abuse to register for
life.118
With overwhelming public support,119 all fifty states implemented
registration and notification regimes in compliance with the Wetterling Act
and Megan’s Law.120 Each state was also free to build upon the minimum
federal requirements and, for the most part,121 states chose to do so.122 For
example, states broadened the number and scope of offenses triggering
registration123 and increased the duration of the registration period.124 States
chose to apply the provisions retroactively to people who had committed their
crimes before the implementation of the program.125 And various states
opted for more active notification methods such as hosting meetings in
communities where registrants live, issuing leaflets, and requiring registrants
to personally notify neighbors of their presence.126

112. Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community
Notification: Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol’s Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333,
349 (1998).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 14072(c), (f)(1).
114. Id. § 14072(c).
115. Id. § 14072(d)(2).
116. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B).
117. Id. § 14072(d)(2)(A).
118. Id. § 14072(d)(2)(B).
119. See Kabat, supra note 112, at 334–35.
120. Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric,
76 IND. L.J. 315, 316–17 (2001).
121. Several states, including Montana and Kansas, refused to expand on the federal SORN
requirements and struck down amendments to include adult consensual sodomy as a
qualifying offense. LOGAN, supra note 9, at 80.
122. See id. at 66–79.
123. Id. Logan provides examples of additional offenses added by the states including
public urination, posting an obscene bumper sticker or writing, and seduction. Id.
124. Id. at 69.
125. Id. at 71.
126. Id. at 78.
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B. Judicial Challenges to First-Generation SORN Laws
1. Lower Court Challenges
As state sex offender laws were implemented across the country,
registrants began challenging first-generation laws as additional forms of
punishment in violation of their constitutional rights as criminal
defendants.127 Many of the initial challenges included allegations that the
regimes functioned as criminal penalties in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause,128 the Double Jeopardy Clause,129 the Bill of Attainder Clause,130
and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.131
In answering the punishment question with respect to state SORN regimes,
most circuit courts applied a version of the intent-effects test discussed in
Part I.B.132 Although each state’s regime varied in scope and severity, lower
courts consistently found that SORN schemes were nonpunitive, both in their
intention and application.133
Nonetheless, several district courts originally struck down community
notification programs on the grounds that they effectively punished
registrants.134 For example, in 1996, Judge Denny Chin of the Southern
District of New York struck down the notification provisions of the New
York State Sex Offender Registration Act in Doe v. Pataki.135 The law
provided for different levels of community notification, assigned pursuant to

127. See Mary K. Evans et al., Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification, in
SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 142, 151. Although
many of the initial challenges against first-generation SORN regimes were brought in state
court and alleged state constitutional violations, this Note looks exclusively at federal
challenges raising the punishment question under the U.S. Constitution.
128. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. See, e.g., E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
130. See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
131. See, e.g., Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996).
132. See Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001); Femedeer v.
Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2000); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 473
(6th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997); Pataki, 120 F.3d at
1274. But see Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 (applying a test that considered the legislature’s
subjective purpose, the objective purpose as indicated by the proportionality and history of the
measure, and the effects of the law).
133. See, e.g., Moore, 253 F.3d at 873; Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253; Cutshall, 193 F.3d at
477; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1093; Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1285; E. B., 119 F.3d at 1111; Artway, 81
F.3d at 1267; Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Roe
v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 193 (D. Mass. 1998); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 854–
55 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Weld, 954
F. Supp. at 436.
134. Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1093 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding that
the punitive effects of the notification scheme were not “merely incidental” to the nonpunitive
purpose), vacated, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1486
(W.D. Wash. 1997) (holding that the public notification provisions were punitive in nature),
rev’d sub nom. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp.
691, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the public notification provisions were punitive), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
135. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 701.
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a registrant’s designated risk.136 In addition, the law created a “900”
telephone number service that members of the public could call, provide
identifying information about the suspected registrant, and, after personally
identifying themselves, receive information about the registrant in
question.137 Judge Chin struck down these provisions for five reasons: (1)
the public dissemination of one’s wrongdoing was a form of punishment
dating back to “biblical times”; (2) notification sought to deter criminal
conduct, a traditional goal of punishment; (3) the dissemination of
information placed a public stigma on registrants that could create “personal
and professional” disabilities or restraints; (4) notification was triggered by
the conviction of a crime; and (5) the negative effects of community
notification, including public ostracization, threats of physical violence, and
job loss, far exceeded the benefits of such provisions.138 Judge Chin’s
decision and others like it were ultimately rejected by the circuit courts.139
Focusing on the legislature’s “objective manifestations,”140 the majority
of circuit courts ascertained legislative intent by considering the language of
the SORN statute,141 the legislature’s stated purpose,142 and the overall
design of the scheme.143 The lower courts consistently determined that state
legislatures did not intend for SORN laws to punish registered sex
offenders.144

136. Id. at 695–96. The personal information of “low” risk registrants was not disclosed
outside of law enforcement agencies. Id. at 695. The information of “moderate” risk
registrants was disclosed to “vulnerable populations” but limited to a registrant’s approximate
address, photograph, and background information. Id. The information of “high” risk
registrants was similarly disseminated to vulnerable populations and also included the
registrant’s exact address. Id. at 695–96.
137. Id. at 696.
138. Id. at 701.
139. See generally Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); Russell v.
Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
140. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1277.
141. See, e.g., Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087.
142. See, e.g., Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001)
(highlighting that the law’s stated purpose was to protect the public); Femedeer v. Haun, 227
F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that the law’s stated purpose, to “apprehend[]
offenders,” was civil); Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d at 54 (focusing on the individualized
clinical assessments as an indication of the legislature’s remedial intent); Artway v. Attorney
Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1264 (3d Cir. 1996); Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1032,
1035 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (focusing on the legislature’s stated purpose of “assuring public
protection” through notification); Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 185 (D. Mass. 1998)
(relying on the legislature’s stated purpose to provide law enforcement with additional
information to prevent sex crimes); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 433 (D. Mass. 1996).
143. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the
law’s limited data collection and community notification only when “necessary to protect the
public” indicated the legislature’s civil intent); Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087–88 (finding the
limited collection of information through mail-in notices demonstrated an intention to monitor
registrants, not punish them); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(noting that the limited dissemination of information to persons living in the same zip code as
the registrant was indicative of the law’s civil purpose).
144. See, e.g., Moore, 253 F.3d at 872; Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249; Cutshall, 193 F.3d at
474; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087–88; E. B., 119 F.3d at 1097; Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264; Byron M.,
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Lower courts also found that first-generation laws were not punitive in
their application to registrants. Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the
courts found that both the registration and notification components were
regulatory in their effects.145 Viewing these laws as analogous to the
registration systems used in other civil programs, various courts upheld the
registration components of state SORN laws.146 Similarly, lower courts
rejected challenges to the laws’ notification components and found that the
programs did not resemble traditional forms of punishment.147
2. Smith v. Doe
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality
of sex offender registration and notification regimes.148 In Smith v. Doe, the
Court answered the punishment question in the negative, concluding that the
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) was not punitive in its intent
or effect on required registrants.149
In 1994, Alaska implemented its registration and notification program in
compliance with both the Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law.150 ASORA
expanded the baseline federal requirements by increasing the duration of
registration;151 registrants convicted of a single sex offense were required to
register for fifteen years and registrants convicted of two and more sex
offenses were required to register for life.152 Although ASORA did not
specifically authorize a method of public disclosure, Alaskan law
enforcement created an online database of nonconfidential registrant
information and made it available to the public.153
Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court applied the intent-effects
analysis articulated in Ward.154 In ascertaining the legislature’s intent, the
Court relied primarily on the text of the statute.155 The Court found that the
legislature’s explicit inclusion of the law’s purpose, “protecting the public
46 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 185; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 853; Weld, 954
F. Supp. at 433.
145. See, e.g., Moore, 253 F.3d at 872; Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250–53; Cutshall, 193 F.3d
at 474–75; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089–92; Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1280–84; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at
854; Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 434–35.
146. See, e.g., Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089; Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 186.
147. See, e.g., Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250–53; Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475; Office of Adult
Prob., 125 F.3d at 55; Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 190; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 854.
148. See generally Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
149. Id. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, however, the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that ASORA violated the Alaska state constitution when applied
retroactively as the effects of law were punitive on registrants. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999,
1019 (Alaska 2008).
150. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 41.
151. Persons convicted of a single sex offense were required to provide written notice of
their information annually for fifteen years, and all persons convicted of two or more sex
offenses were required register for life. Id.
152. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 41 § 12.63.020(a)(1)–(2).
153. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.
154. Id. at 92.
155. Id. at 93.
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from sex offenders,” was indicative of its civil intention.156 The Court
rejected arguments that ASORA’s codification in the criminal procedure
code157 and the state’s policy of alerting registrants of their duty to register
at criminal sentencing were dispositive of the legislature’s criminal
preference.158
In his concurring opinion, Justice David Souter challenged this position
and stated that the legislature’s intent was not “clearly civil.”159 Finding
ASORA to be a “close case,”160 Justice Souter highlighted the legislature’s
failure to explicitly label the law as civil and the inclusion of the criminal
components already discussed by the majority.161 Justice Souter, along with
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in their dissent,162 advocated for a new test:
where the legislature’s intention is unclear, the heightened burden on the
challenger to prove the law’s punitive effects by the “clearest proof” should
be disregarded.163
In its analysis of ASORA’s effects, the majority limited its review to the
following Mendoza-Martinez factors:
(1) history and tradition as
punishment, (2) affirmative disability or restraint, (3) promotion of the
traditional aims of punishment, (4) rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose, and (5) excessiveness with respect to that nonpunitive purpose.164
The Court reasoned that the remaining factors—whether the sanction
requires a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which the sanction
applies is already a crime—were not relevant to its analysis.165
In assessing the first Mendoza-Martinez factor, the Court rejected the
challenger’s comparisons of ASORA to other traditional forms of
punishment.166 Given the relatively recent inception of these schemes, the
Court found that neither the registration nor the notification component could
be considered “traditional.”167 The Court determined that the programs
could not be considered forms of public shaming because that punishment

156. Id.
157. Id. at 95.
158. Id. at 95–96.
159. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 107–08.
162. Id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 97 (majority opinion). Justice John Paul Stevens proposed a new test for
determining whether a measure is punitive. Under his formulation, a law is punitive if: (1) it
is imposed on everyone who commits a crime, (2) it is not imposed on anyone else, and (3) it
severely impairs a person’s liberty. Id. at 112. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
165. Id. at 105 (majority opinion). The Court acknowledged that although ASORA’s
requirements were triggered by the commission of a crime, usually an indication of a
sanction’s punitiveness, the criminal element was necessary to accomplish the law’s
nonpunitive aim of reducing recidivism. Id.
166. Id. at 98.
167. Id. at 97.
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historically required face-to-face humiliation.168 Similarly, the schemes
were not analogous to banishment because banishment required physical
expulsion from society.169 The Court rejected arguments that the internet
notification component resembled public shaming and emphasized that the
purpose of public disclosure is “to inform the public for its own safety, not
to humiliate the offender.”170 The Court instead analogized ASORA to the
publication of criminal records, a common civil practice not intended to
punish criminals.171
Considering the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, affirmative disability or
restraint, the Court concluded that ASORA’s restrictive effects were “minor
and indirect.”172 First, the Court noted that ASORA did not impose any
physical restraint on registrants and thus did not resemble imprisonment.173
Second, the Court determined that ASORA did not involve any active
supervision of registrants and thus did not function like probation or
parole.174 The Court noted that ASORA did not require in-person reporting
to law enforcement but rather provided only for written registration.175 In
response to registrants’ argument that the public’s reaction to ASORA
created affirmative restraints on personal liberty, the Court held that these
restrictions stemmed from their crimes, not from the registration and
notification obligations.176
In considering the third Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether ASORA
promoted the traditional aims of punishment, the Court concluded that the
presence of a deterrent purpose was not dispositive of the law’s punitive
nature.177 Acknowledging that civil laws frequently deter crime without
imposing punishment, the Court declined to give this factor much weight.178
Further, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding that ASORA was
retributive.179 Although the duration of registration outlined in ASORA was
based on the type and frequency of conviction, rather than an assessment of
a registrant’s current dangerousness, the Court determined that past
convictions were rationally related to a registrant’s risk of recidivism.180
In assessing the fourth and fifth Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court
determined that ASORA was rationally connected to its nonpunitive purpose
and was not excessive in furtherance of that regulatory purpose.181
168. Id. at 99 (“In contrast to colonial shaming punishments, however, the State does not
make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory
scheme.”).
169. Id. at 98.
170. Id. at 99.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 101.
173. Id. at 100.
174. Id. at 101.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 102.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 102–03.
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Identifying public safety as ASORA’s nonpunitive goal,182 the Court
emphasized that the connection between the law’s ends and means was the
most significant factor in its punishment analysis.183 The majority
highlighted the notification component, finding that alerting community
members to the presence of sex offenders was rationally related to public
safety.184 Concluding that ASORA was not excessive in its promotion of
safety, the Court rejected registrants’ arguments that the law’s lack of
individualized assessment and wide dissemination rendered it punitive.185
The Court clarified, “[a] statute is not deemed punitive simply because it
lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.”186
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that although ASORA was not
identical to traditional forms of punishment, its effects sufficiently resembled
parole or probation and historical shaming punishments.187 Because
registration requires frequent reporting to law enforcement, Justice Ginsburg
argued, the registration component functions like supervised release or
parole.188 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the notification component
resembled public shaming because it required the state to affix a negative
label to the registrant and publicize that label to the community.189
Justice Ginsburg further rejected the majority’s conclusion on the grounds
that ASORA “notably exceed[ed]” the purpose of public safety by applying
to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their current
dangerousness.190 By basing duration of registration on conviction rather
than a registrant’s actual risk of recidivism, ASORA went beyond the scope
of public safety. Most important to Justice Ginsburg’s analysis was the fact
that ASORA did not account for the possibility of rehabilitation and offered
registrants no ability to petition the court for relief.191
C. Modern SORN Laws
Following the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress passed the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006192 (AWA), which replaced the
Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law and provided more expansive baseline
guidelines for state SORN schemes.193 Title I of the AWA, containing the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act194 (SORNA), details the
182. Id.
183. Id. at 102.
184. Id. at 103.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 117.
192. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
193. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 62–65.
194. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
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federal standards for applicable jurisdictions.195 As with the prior federal
legislative scheme, states are obligated to “substantially implement” the new
requirements or lose 10 percent of their federal funding for crime
prevention.196
SORNA differs from its predecessors in several important ways. First,
SORNA broadens the scope of existing SORN regimes through the addition
of qualifying crimes and offenses.197 In redefining the term “sex offense,”
Congress made SORNA applicable to all persons convicted of a criminal
offense involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another person.198
SORNA further increases the pool of registrants by adding new crimes to the
definition of a “specified offense against a minor.”199 In addition to the
crimes previously detailed in the Wetterling Act, SORNA includes offenses
related to video voyeurism, child pornography, and “criminal sexual conduct
involving a minor or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such
conduct.”200
SORNA also imposes harsher reporting obligations on registrants by
increasing the duration of registration and the frequency of reporting,201
requiring the collection and disclosure of additional personal information,202
and mandating in-person verification of information.203 SORNA bases the
duration of registration and frequency of reporting on a registrant’s tier level
within a three-tier classification system.204 However, a person’s tier is tied
only to their original conviction, without regard to any individualized
assessment of current dangerousness.205 Once a registrant is assigned a tier
level, that designation is final and unreviewable.206
Under the federal requirements, tier I registrants are required to register
for fifteen years and verify their information annually.207 Tier II registrants
are required to register for twenty-five years and verify their information
every six months.208 Tier III registrants are required to register for life and
verify their information every three months.209 Under this new system, all

195. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (Supp. 2017).
196. Id. § 20927.
197. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 45.
198. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5). SORNA does not apply to offenses involving consensual
sexual conduct “if the victim was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority
of the offender at the time of the offense, or if victim was at least 13 years old and the offender
was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” Id. § 20911(5)(C).
199. Id. § 20911(5)(A).
200. Id. § 20911(7)(F)–(H).
201. Id. §§ 20915, 20918.
202. Id. §§ 20914, 20920.
203. Id. § 20918.
204. Id. §§ 20915, 20918.
205. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 45.
206. 34 U.S.C. § 20915.
207. Id. §§ 20915, 20918.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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registrants must report to their local enforcement agency in person and allow
their jurisdiction to take a current photograph.210
In 2008, Congress supplemented the federal requirements with the
Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 2008211 (the “KIDS
Act”) to address the issue of online safety.212 The KIDS Act requires all
jurisdictions to collect the “internet identifiers” of registrants during the
registration process.213 The KIDS Act, however, does not require
community notification of such information.214 In 2016, Congress passed
the International Megan’s Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other
Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex
Offenders,215 which requires jurisdictions to mandate that registrants provide
notice twenty-one days prior to intended international travel.216 The law also
required the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the
Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a plan to mark
the U.S. passports of “covered sex offenders” with unique identifiers.217
Unlike the overwhelming support shown for the Wetterling Act and
Megan’s Law,218 SORNA and its amendments have been met with resistance
from the states.219 As of November 2019, only eighteen states had
substantially implemented SORNA’s standards.220 Noncompliant states
have cited the program’s financial burdens and lack of public safety benefits
as reasons for not implementing the new requirements.221
Despite the lack of universal support for SORNA, some states have
continued to expand SORN schemes beyond the original guidelines in the
Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law.222 In addition to the state variations
discussed in Part II.A, states continue to go beyond the minimum
requirements with the expansion of residency restrictions and GPS
monitoring programs.

210. Id. § 20918.
211. Pub L. No. 110-400, 122 Stat. 4224 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 34
U.S.C.).
212. Legislative History of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification, SMART,
https://www.smart.gov/legislation.htm [https://perma.cc/G38Y-MYWZ] (last visited Nov. 12,
2019).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Pub. L. No. 114-119, 130 Stat. 15 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
216. Id.
217. See 22 U.S.C. § 212b (Supp. 2016); 34 U.S.C. § 21507 (Supp. 2017); see also
Passports
and
International
Megan’s
Law,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
https://
travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/passports/passports-and-international-meganslaw.html [https://perma.cc/HAV7-4FXS] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. Evans et al., supra note 127, at 146.
220. See SORNA Implementation Status, SMART, https://smart.gov/sorna-map.htm
[https://perma.cc/BK25-KFXW] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
221. Evans et al., supra note 127, at 147.
222. LOGAN, supra note 9, at 66–78.
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As of July 2019, thirty-four states had supplemented their SORN laws with
residency restrictions.223 Residency restrictions allow communities to
prohibit a registrant from living, working, or traveling within a specified
proximity to designated places.224 Depending on the severity of the
restriction, registrants may be prohibited from living within 100 to 3000 feet
of a designated area.225 These areas typically include places where minors
congregate such as schools, parks, playgrounds, places of worship, and
public athletic fields.226 In some cases, designated areas can include broader
locations such as “adult group homes.”227
States have also expanded their SORN regimes by implementing GPS
programs to electronically monitor the location of designated registrants.228
Enforcement agencies use GPS technology to both restrict where registrants
may travel and conduct surveillance on their locations.229 An increasing
number of states are progressing from passive monitoring, which allows law
enforcement to retroactively assess a registrant’s whereabouts, to active
tracking, which provides law enforcement with near-real-time data.230 For
example, the Tennessee Serious and Violent Sex Offender Monitoring Pilot
Project Act authorizes the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation to use GPS
technology to both report a registrant’s location once a day and track a
registrant’s whereabouts in real time.231
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER MODERN SORN LAWS
Since SORNA’s enactment and states’ compliance with or
supplementation of the new federal standards, required registrants have
initiated a second round of constitutional challenges in the federal courts. In
this new series of actions, registrants argue that the harsher SORN laws are
distinguishable from the first-generation laws previously considered.232 By
including more burdensome restrictions and broader notification provisions,
223. See Residency Restriction by State (For Persons Required to Register as Sex
Offenders), FLA. ACTION COMMITTEE (July 11, 2019), https://floridaactioncommittee.org/
residency-restrictions-by-state-for-persons-required-to-register-as-sex-offenders
[https://
perma.cc/CR4M-DBYX]. This number does not include local residency restrictions.
224. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 66–78.
225. Id. at 57.
226. See, e.g., Doe v. Gwyn, No. 3:17-CV-504, 2018 WL 1957788, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Apr.
25, 2018); Hoffman v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 249 F. Supp. 3d 951, 954 (E.D. Wis. 2017).
227. See, e.g., Evenstad v. City of West St. Paul, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1091 (D. Minn.
2018).
228. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 61.
229. Michelle L. Meloy, You Can Run but You Cannot Hide: GPS and Electronic
Surveillance of Sex Offenders, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS,
supra note 2, at 165, 166.
230. Id. at 175.
231. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1001 (6th Cir. 2007).
232. See, e.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 570 (10th Cir. 2016) (The registrant argued
that Oklahoma’s residency restriction was more burdensome than the Alaskan statute.); ACLU
of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2012) (The registrant argued that the
Nevada SORN law was distinguishable from the Alaskan statute because it provided for active
notification.).
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registrants contend that modern SORN laws have become forms of criminal
punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution.233 Part III.A outlines the
punishment analysis applied by the majority of courts. Part III.B then
explores the analyses applied by a minority of courts that strike down
punitive SORN schemes.
A. The Nonpunitive Majority
Despite the broader and more restrictive obligations imposed by modern
SORN laws, the majority of federal courts have rejected registrants’
arguments that these schemes are punitive.234 Instead, courts have frequently
upheld SORNA’s guidelines235 and state and local SORN regimes as
nonpunitive regulatory measures.236 In rendering their decisions, courts
consistently rely on the same justifications, including: (1) that Smith has
foreclosed a punitive finding, (2) that the challenged law is analogous to a
233. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797
(Jan. 7, 2019) (No. 18-386) (mem.); Doe v. Miami-Dade County, 846 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir.
2017); Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016); Shaw, 823 F.3d 556; Riley v.
Corbett, 622 F. App’x 93 (3d Cir. 2015); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014); King
v. McCraw, 559 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948
(9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012);
ACLU of Nev., 670 F.3d 1046; United States v. W. B. H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Wass, No. 7:18-CR-45-BO, 2018 WL 3341180 (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2018),
appeal docketed, No. 18-4547 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018); Doe v. Gwyn, No. 3:17-CV-504, 2018
WL 1957788 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2018); Evenstad v. City of West St. Paul, 306 F. Supp. 3d
1086 (D. Minn. 2018); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017); United States v. Morgan, 255 F. Supp. 3d
221 (D.D.C. 2017); Hoffman v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 249 F. Supp. 3d 951 (E.D. Wis.
2017); Brown v. Montoya, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D.N.M. 2014).
234. See, e.g., Vasquez, 895 F.3d 515; Shaw, 823 F.3d 556; Riley, 622 F. App’x 93; Cuomo,
755 F.3d 105; King, 559 F. App’x 278; Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948; Under Seal, 709 F.3d
257; Parks, 698 F.3d 1; Felts, 674 F.3d 599; ACLU of Nev., 670 F.3d 1046; W. B. H., 664 F.3d
848; United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217
(10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008); Hall v. Attorney Gen., 266 F. App’x 355 (5th Cir.
2008); Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998; United States v. Cotton, 760 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.D.C. 2011).
235. See, e.g., Under Seal, 709 F.3d at 263; Parks, 698 F.3d at 6; Leach, 639 F.3d at 773;
United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah,
595 F.3d 151, 158–59 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir.
2010); Young, 585 F.3d at 204; United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. May, 535 F.3d
912, 919 (8th Cir. 2008); Morgan, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 234.
236. See, e.g., Shaw, 823 F.3d at 577 (upholding Oklahoma’s SORN law); Cuomo, 755
F.3d at 111–12 (upholding New York’s SORN law); ACLU of Nev., 670 F.3d at 1058
(upholding Nevada’s sex offender registration statute); Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d 1165,
1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the District of Columbia’s SORN law); Houston v.
Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding Florida’s sex offender registration
statute); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding Wisconsin’s sex
offender registration statute); Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1008 (upholding the Tennessee Sexual
Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004);
Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding
Arkansas’s SORN law); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding
California’s sex offender registration statute).
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SORN law previously upheld as civil, and (3) that the challenged law is
analogous to an existing civil remedy.
1. Bound by Smith v. Doe
Courts in the majority frequently interpret Smith to stand for the
proposition that all sex offender legislation is civil in nature.237 Instead of
reviewing the provisions of the challenged SORN law and considering the
effects of those provisions on registrants, these courts have held that Smith
effectively forecloses any finding that SORN laws punish registrants.238 As
an example, in Herrera v. Williams,239 the Tenth Circuit held that New
Mexico’s SORN regime was a regulatory scheme.240 Citing to Smith, the
court concluded that “sex offender registry laws do not fall within the
purview of the ex post facto clause because they impose only civil burdens
and do not implicate criminal punishments.”241 Instead of reviewing the
specific provisions of New Mexico’s sex offender legislation, the court
simply concluded that there was no evidence “tending to establish the New
Mexico statute is in any way different” than the Alaskan statute in Smith.242
In the same vein, the Seventh Circuit in Steward v. Folz243 determined that
a court need only review legislative intent when conducting the punishment
analysis for sex offender legislation because Smith foreclosed a finding that
the law’s effects could function to punish registrants.244 Without discussing
the particular obligations imposed by Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration
Act, the court found, through citation to Smith, “that sex offender registration
statutes do not violate the ex post facto clause if their aims are not
punitive.”245 Because the legislature had intended the law to be nonpunitive,
the court concluded that its analysis was complete and the law was civil.246
237. See, e.g., Hall, 266 F. App’x at 356 (“Retroactive application of laws requiring sexoffender registration and notification do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”); Bredesen,
507 F.3d at 1004; Steward v. Folz, 190 F. App’x 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2006); Herrera v. Williams,
99 F. App’x 188, 190 (10th Cir. 2004).
238. See, e.g., Holland v. Governor of Ga., No. 18-13445, 2019 WL 3716396, at *2 (11th
Cir. Aug. 7, 2019) (“Section 42-1-12(e)(3) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because,
like the registration statutes that have been upheld by both the Supreme Court and this Court,
it imposes a civil regulatory regime rather than punishment.”); Does 1–134 v. Wasden, No.
16-cv-00429, 2019 WL 1508037, at *7 (D. Idaho Apr. 5, 2019) (“The Smith Court expressly
rejected the notion that the harms Plaintiffs allege, such as social ostracization and difficulties
finding housing or employment, are so punitive as to negate the civil intent of sexual offender
registration statutes.”), appeal docketed, No. 19-35391 (9th Cir. May 6, 2019); Norris v.
Indiana, No. 1:16-cv-03059, 2016 WL 7188230, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 2016) (holding that
the amendments to Indiana’s Sexually Violent Predator program were not punitive and noting
that “[w]hether a comprehensive registration regime targeting only sex offenders is penal . . .
is not an open question” (quoting Leach, 639 F.3d at 773)).
239. 99 F. App’x 188 (10th Cir. 2004).
240. Id. at 190.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 190 F. App’x 476 (7th Cir. 2006).
244. Id. at 478.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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2. Analogous to Civil SORN Laws
Courts in the majority have also dismissed challenges to modern SORN
laws by comparing them to the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith and
concluding that they are indistinguishable.247 Similarly, courts have found
that, even where distinctions exist, the additional obligations imposed by
modern SORN laws do not meaningfully alter the Supreme Court’s
punishment analysis.248 Applying this approach, the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. W. B. H.249 upheld SORNA on the grounds that, although
the standards imposed more expansive and harsher burdens on registrants,
the relationship between SORNA’s regulatory purpose and the means used
to achieve that purpose were not “materially different” from those found in
Smith.250 Unlike the registrant in Smith, however, the registrant in W. B. H.
was convicted as a youthful offender.251 Although the court conceded that
youthful offenders may have lower recidivism rates than adult offenders, that
fact, the court concluded, “does not mean registration requirements covering
younger sex offenders are excessive.”252 Instead, the court focused on the
similarities between SORNA and ASORA, pointing out that both schemes
grouped registrants in categories by conviction rather than through individual
assessment of dangerousness and applied different reporting requirements
depending on categorical placement.253
The Ninth Circuit in Clark v. Ryan254 similarly upheld Arizona’s SORN
program despite acknowledging that increasing internet use created new
threats to registrants’ liberty.255 The registrant argued that these threats,
247. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797
(Jan. 7, 2019) (No. 18-386) (mem.); Riley v. Corbett, 622 F. App’x 93, 95 (3d Cir. 2015)
(holding that Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law was not materially different from ASORA); United
States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that Alaska’s statute contained a “nearly
identical registration requirement” to that in SORNA); Brown v. Montoya, 45 F. Supp. 3d
1294, 1301 (D.N.M. 2014) (finding New Mexico’s regime to be “virtually indistinguishable”
from the Alaskan statute).
248. See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Active
dissemination of an individual’s sex offender status does not alter the Court’s core
reasoning . . . .”); United States v. Cotton, 760 F. Supp. 2d 116, 137–38 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“SORNA’s penalty provision and reporting requirements may be more onerous than the
Alaska statute at issue in Smith, but these differences cannot establish by ‘clearest proof’ that
SORNA’s overall regulatory scheme is punitive.”); Prynne v. Northam, No. 1:19-CV-329,
2019 WL 3860197, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2019) (“Plaintiff lastly complains of what she
describes as the ‘web of reporting requirements.’ These include blood sampling and
fingerprinting, short time periods within which to report changes in information, and frequent,
potentially embarrassing routine reporting. As noted above, many courts have looked at these
or similar requirements and found that they are not punitive. . . . While they may be onerous
for some, the registration requirements are merely portions of a remedial statutory regime and
the sort of inconvenience that attends any registration regime.”).
249. 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011).
250. Id. at 859–60.
251. Id. at 860.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 859.
254. 836 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2016).
255. Id. at 1017.
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which were not considered in Smith—namely cyberstalking and
cyberharassment—made Arizona’s SORN law sufficiently analogous to
public shaming; the law required registrants to provide their online identifiers
and this “website identification w[ould] likely facilitate harassment.”256 The
court found that although “[i]nternet use had indeed increased since the
Supreme Court decided Smith in 2003, the Court specifically considered the
vast ‘geographic reach of the Internet’ in its decision.”257
3. Analogous to Civil Remedies
Courts in the majority also compare SORN regimes to other civil sanctions
that have been upheld by the Supreme Court. For example, the Second
Circuit in Doe v. Cuomo258 rejected a challenge to the New York Sex
Offender Registration Act on the grounds that the Supreme Court had
previously upheld the “‘termination of financial support[] and loss of
livelihood,’ both of which . . . represent ‘far heavier burdens.’”259 Without
referencing them explicitly, the court referred to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Flemming v. Nestor,260 in which the Court held that the
termination of social security benefits was nonpunitive,261 and Hawker v.
New York,262 in which the Court held that the prevention of convicted felons
from practicing medicine was regulatory.263 The Second Circuit reasoned
that because those sanctions were more burdensome than sex offender
registration and notification obligations, the New York Sex Offender
Registration Act was nonpunitive.264
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller265 upheld an Iowa residency
restriction after comparing it to civil sanctions previously upheld by the
Supreme Court.266 Reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit found that
the residency restriction was not excessive in relation to its nonpunitive
purpose despite the fact that it applied to all registrants without an
individualized assessment of their current dangerousness.267 The court
supported its holding by referencing the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Hawker and De Veau v. Braisted,268 both of which upheld restrictions that
were imposed on classes of offenders without individualized assessment.269
The court concluded that because the Supreme Court had previously upheld

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003)).
755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 112 (quoting Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997)).
363 U.S. 603 (1960).
See generally id.
170 U.S. 189 (1898).
See generally id.
Cuomo, 755 F.3d at 112.
405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 721–22.
Id. at 721.
363 U.S. 144 (1960).
Miller, 405 F.3d at 721.
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schemes that did not employ individualized assessments, Iowa’s residency
restriction was not excessive and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.270
B. The Punitive Minority
As federal, state, and local SORN laws have expanded in scope and
intensity, some federal courts have responded by reconstructing the
punishment analysis to find that modern SORN laws cross the threshold of
criminal punishment. Part III.B.1 explains the Sixth Circuit’s decision that
began this movement and Part III.B.2 details how other federal courts have
used the Sixth Circuit’s analysis to alter the punishment test.
1. Does #1–5 v. Snyder
On August 25, 2016, the tide of nonpunitive holdings across federal courts
began to turn when the Sixth Circuit struck down the amendments to the
Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act (MSORA). In Does #1–5 v. Snyder,
the Sixth Circuit held that the amendments to MSORA violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause because they were punitive in their effects on registrants.271
More burdensome than the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith, MSORA
prohibited registrants from living, working, or loitering within 1000 feet of a
school; divided registrants into three tiers based solely on conviction without
regard to current dangerousness; and required in-person reporting of minor
changes such as the creation or alteration of internet identifiers.272 The court
characterized these burdensome amendments as a movement towards a
“byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex
offenders.”273 The court concluded that these additional provisions
effectively increased the punishment on registered sex offenders.274
Adhering to the test devised by the Supreme Court in Smith,275 the Sixth
Circuit analyzed both the intent of the enacting legislature and the effects of
the legislation.276 Although the law contained features that could suggest a
punitive intent—“e.g., SORA is triggered solely by criminal offenses and the
registration requirement is recorded on the judgment; registration is handled
by criminal justice agencies like the police; SORA imposes criminal
sanctions; and it is codified in Chapter 28 of the Michigan Code, a chapter
that deals with police-related laws”—the court determined that these features
were similar to those in Smith and declined to find that the law’s intent was
punitive.277
In conducting its effects analysis, the court limited its review to the five
Mendoza-Martinez factors considered by the Smith Court as the most
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 723.
Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 698 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 706.
See supra Part II.B.2.
Snyder, 834 F.3d at 706.
Id. at 701.
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relevant to SORN regimes.278 The Sixth Circuit considered whether
MSORA resembled a historical or traditional form of punishment, imposed
an affirmative disability or restraint, promoted the traditional aims of
punishment, bore a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and was
excessive with respect to its nonpunitive purpose.279
Considering the first factor, the court determined that MSORA’s
amendments resembled historical forms of punishment280: residency
restrictions mirrored banishment,281 the publication of tier designations
resembled public shaming,282 and the combination of the residency
restriction and in-person reporting requirement functioned like probation or
The court compared MSORA’s residency restriction to
parole.283
banishment but conceded that the statute did not make registrants “dead in
law [and] entirely cut off from society,” as William Blackstone had described
the traditional punishment.284 Although the residency restriction did not
forbid registrants from physically entering the designated areas,285 the court
nonetheless concluded that the burdensome geographical restrictions “forced
[registrants] to tailor much of their lives around these school zones.”286
The court analogized MSORA’s notification of tier classifications to
public shaming, finding that the notification of nonpublic information
functioned to shame registrants.287 Unlike the Alaskan statute in Smith,
which limited disclosure to public information,288 MSORA authorized the
publication of a registrant’s tier classification.289 Although tier assignments
were based on a registrant’s conviction, which is ultimately public
information, the court concluded that “the ignominy under [MSORA] flows
not only from the past offense, but also from the statute itself.”290
The court compared MSORA’s residency restriction and in-person
reporting requirements to parole and probation.291 Unlike the statute in
Smith, which placed no limitations on where a registrant could work or live
and required only mail-in registration,292 MSORA subjected registrants to
various geographical restrictions and required registrants to verify their
information in person.293 The court reasoned that, although the degree of
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 701–03.
281. Id. at 702–03.
282. Id. at 703.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 701 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 702.
287. Id.
288. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003) (“[T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results
not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate
information about a criminal record, most of which is already public.”).
289. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 702–03.
290. Id. at 703.
291. Id.
292. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.
293. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 703.
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individual supervision was less severe than parole, MSORA’s requirements
had a “great deal in common” with the traditional form of punishment.294
Looking to the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, affirmative restraint or
disability, the court determined that the geographical restrictions and inperson reporting requirements functioned as “direct restraints on personal
conduct.”295 The court emphasized that although these provisions did not
place registrants in physical handcuffs, “these irons are always in the
background” as failure to comply with the provisions could result in
imprisonment.296
Considering the third Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the law promotes
the traditional aims of punishment, the court found MSORA’s advancement
of punitive aims to be insignificant.297 As the Supreme Court iterated in
Smith, civil laws can further the goals of punishment without rendering them
punitive in nature.298 The Sixth Circuit determined that although MSORA
advanced the traditional aims of punishment including incapacitation,
retribution, and deterrence, the factor should be afforded little weight.299
Under the fourth and fifth factors, the law’s rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose and the excessiveness of that connection, the court
determined that the legislature’s goal of reducing the rate of recidivism was
only loosely related to the amended provisions.300 In reaching this
conclusion, the court referenced the legislature’s lack of statistical evidence
supporting the law’s positive effects.301 The court focused instead on a study
provided by the registrants, which demonstrated that SORN laws actually
increase the risk of recidivism.302 The court concluded that given the indirect
relationship between MSORA and its purportedly nonpunitive aim, MSORA
was excessive when compared to the minimally positive benefits of its
effects.303
Looking at all five factors together, the court determined that the effects
of the amendments were “different from and more troubling” than the effects
of the statutory scheme considered in Smith.304 In reaching its decision, the
Sixth Circuit refused to view Smith as a “blank check” for states to expand
sex offender legislation.305 In holding that MSORA violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the court warned, “as dangerous as it may be not to punish
someone, it is far more dangerous to permit the government under guise of
civil regulation to punish people without prior notice.”306
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 704–05.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 706.
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2. Lower Courts Follow Snyder’s Lead
In the wake of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Snyder, a minority of federal
courts have altered the existing punishment analysis to find that modern
SORN laws can, in their effects, punish registrants.307. First, minority courts
perform independent analyses of the challenged laws rather than rely solely
on Smith, analogous SORN laws, or other civil sanctions. Second, minority
courts look to the effects of the punishment rather than the act itself when
analyzing the “historical form of punishment” prong. Lastly, minority courts
consider nonphysical restrictions when determining whether a SORN law
imposes affirmative restraints or disabilities.
Courts in the minority have revised the punishment analysis by conducting
independent Mendoza-Martinez analyses even where there is relevant
precedent considering similar SORN laws.308 Unlike many courts in the
majority, these courts lay out the provisions of the challenged SORN law and
perform a punishment analysis based on the cumulative effects of that
particular scheme rather than deferring to factually similar cases.
The decision of the District of Minnesota in Evenstad v. City of West St.
Paul 309 is illustrative. In this case, the registrant moved for a preliminary
injunction against a city ordinance that prohibited registered sex offenders
from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group
homes.310 These restrictions were estimated to cover approximately 90
percent of the city.311 The court acknowledged that there were two Eighth
Circuit cases on point, both of which considered residency restrictions, but
declined to find that that they were binding.312 Instead, the court reviewed
the provisions of the challenged ordinance and went through the MendozaMartinez factors, acknowledging the similarities and differences between the
ordinance and the residency restrictions of the other two cases.313 In
considering the affirmative restraints imposed by the ordinance, the District
of Minnesota highlighted that the ordinance was broader than the other two
residency restrictions in three crucial ways: “it is intended to protect more
307. See, e.g., Doe v. Miami-Dade County, 846 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2017); United States
v. Wass, No. 7:18-CR-45-BO, 2018 WL 3341180 (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2018), appeal docketed,
No. 18-4547 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018); Doe v. Gwyn, No. 3:17-CV-504, 2018 WL 1957788
(E.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2018); Evenstad v. City of West St. Paul, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1086 (D. Minn.
2018); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 171333 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017); Hoffman v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 249 F. Supp. 3d 951
(E.D. Wis. 2017).
308. See, e.g., Wass, 2018 WL 3341180, at *4 (conducting an independent analysis of
SORNA despite acknowledging that other courts had found Smith “forceful when finding that
SORNA’s retroactive registration requirements are also constitutional”); Millard, 265 F.
Supp. 3d at 1225 (performing an independent analysis of Colorado’s SORN law after finding
that the court in Shaw v. Patton, a case upholding Colorado’s program as nonpunitive, only
considered the requirements that applied to the registrant challenging the law).
309. 306 F. Supp. 3d 1086 (D. Minn. 2018).
310. Id. at 1091.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1094 (discussing Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) and Weems v. Little
Rock Police Department, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006)).
313. Id. at 1096–1100.
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than just minors, it restricts offenders who victimized adults without an
individualized case-by-case assessment, and it restricts residency near group
homes.”314 In granting the injunction, the court concluded that these
additional restrictions, “outside the traditional operation of these sorts of
statutes,” resulted in a SORN program that was “more reminiscent of [a]
complete ban.”315 After conducting an independent analysis of the
cumulative effects of the ordinance, the court determined that the ordinance
had gone further than the residency restrictions considered in precedent and
these additional restraints altered the outcome of the punishment analysis.316
Courts in the minority have also altered the punishment analysis by
changing the focus of the “historical form of punishment” inquiry. Instead
of comparing the acts of punishment alone, minority courts look to the effects
of both traditional forms of punishment and modern SORN laws to determine
whether they are analogous.317 For example, in United States v. Wass,318 the
Eastern District of North Carolina accepted a registrant’s challenge to
SORNA as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and agreed that the federal
legislation functioned to punish.319 In its decision, the court determined that
SORNA’s notification component “made it a tool of public shame, which has
been a consistent mechanism for punishment in human history.”320 In
differentiating SORNA from the Alaskan statute in Smith, the court focused
on the public’s reception of notification, rather than its actual dissemination:
“the purpose of the notification here is to elicit a reaction from the public
who is notified, and that reaction is punitive in nature.”321 The court further
emphasized, “[a] punitive scheme does not become a non-punitive one just
because those who bear the burdens deserve to be punished.”322
Similarly, in Millard v. Rankin,323 the District of Colorado struck down
the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, finding that its in-person
reporting provisions resembled parole or probation.324 The court focused
primarily on the statute’s requirement of in-person reporting of “‘all e-mail
addresses, instant-messaging identities, or chat room identities prior to using
the address of identity,’ as well as any changes of such addresses or
identities.”325 The court concluded that in allowing law enforcement to
314. Id. at 1097.
315. Id. at 1100.
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., United States v. Wass, No. 7:18-CR-45-BO, 2018 WL 3341180, at *5
(E.D.N.C. July 6, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-4547 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018); Millard v.
Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1229 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir.
Sept. 21, 2017).
318. No. 7:18-CR-45-BO, 2018 WL 3341180 (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2018), appeal docketed,
No. 18-4547 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018).
319. Id. at *5.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir. Sept.
21, 2017).
324. Id. at 1228.
325. Id.
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“monitor private aspects of a registered sex offender’s life,” the law imposed
burdens similar to those imposed on parolees.326
Finally, minority courts have modified the punishment analysis by
considering both physical and nonphysical restrictions when assessing the
“affirmative restraint or disability” prong of the Mendoza-Martinez test.327
Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Snyder, minority courts have
determined that modern sex offender laws, particularly in-person reporting
requirements, can be punitive because they impose affirmative restraints on
registrants’ liberty. Notably, in Millard’s review of the affirmative restraints
imposed by the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, the District of
Colorado highlighted that the law required in-person registration at the
registrant’s local law enforcement agency, a requirement not considered in
Smith.328 In determining that the restraints imposed by in-person reporting
requirements were far greater than those imposed by the written registration
mandated in Smith,329 the court concluded,
Having to report to law enforcement every time one moves, as well as at
regular time intervals, is hardly a “minor or indirect” restraint, especially
when failure to do so is punishable as a crime and also may subject the
registrant to in-person home visits and public humiliation by over-zealous,
malicious, or at least insensitive law enforcement personnel.330

IV. THE PUNISHMENT QUESTION AND MODERN SORN LAWS
The inconsistencies across federal courts in applying the punishment
analysis to modern SORN laws highlight existing flaws in the punishment
test. Particularly in cases involving sex offender legislation, the majority of
courts have shifted the focus of the punishment test away from the actual
effects of the challenged practice on those subject to its sanctions. Instead,
majority courts look primarily to the type of law in question, grouping all
SORN laws together and categorizing them as civil regulatory programs.
This approach fails to consider how additional burdens and obligations
imposed by modern SORN laws, such as residency restrictions, in-person
reporting requirements, and GPS tracking, can alter the punishment analysis.
This Part lays out three proposed alterations to the punishment test with the
aim of eliminating inconsistency in the categorization of civil and criminal
measures and preserving the constitutional rights available only in the
criminal context.
First, the punishment test should require that courts perform an
independent assessment of the challenged law if the law is distinct from
sanctions considered in precedential cases. As discussed in Part III.A, the
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Doe v. Miami-Dade County, 846 F.3d 1180, 1186 (11th Cir. 2017); Doe v.
Gwyn, No. 3:17-CV-504, 2018 WL 1957788, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2018); Millard, 265
F. Supp. 3d at 1229; Hoffman v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 249 F. Supp. 3d 951, 960 (E.D.
Wis. 2017).
328. Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1229.
329. Id. at 1229.
330. Id.

1130

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

majority of federal courts rely on precedent without regard to how modern
SORN laws have created additional restraints on registrants’ liberty.
Because SORN laws have expanded in scope and severity over time and can
vary dramatically from state to state, courts must perform independent
analyses of challenged laws to account for the varying degrees of intrusion
and restraint on the rights of registrants. As indicated in the Snyder decision,
the addition of SORN provisions, such as residency restrictions and in-person
reporting requirements, can transform a nonpunitive law into a punitive
one.331 It is thus imperative that courts consider each law independently and
review all of the provisions together to determine the law’s effects on
required registrants.
Second, the “historical form of punishment” prong should be revised to
remove the requirement of long-standing use and should focus on how
closely the effects of the challenged practice resemble the effects of
traditional forms of punishment. As applied in Smith, the comparison of a
challenged law to traditional forms of punishment distorts the focus of the
punishment analysis. First, the Court in Smith interpreted this factor to
require the long-standing use of the practice in question. In the case of SORN
laws, this inquiry will always work against registrants as registration and
notification programs have only been in existence since the 1980s.332 As
technology continues to evolve at unprecedented rates and provide for more
intrusive methods of monitoring, it is dubious to require the long-term use of
a practice before finding that it has the effect of punishing someone. Second,
the Smith Court applied this factor too narrowly, requiring a near-perfect
match to the traditional form of punishment. By requiring that the law
provide for face-to-face humiliation to resemble shaming or physical
expulsion from society to resemble banishment, the Court distorted the
purpose of the punishment test: to determine whether the effects of the
challenged measure are punitive. Courts must instead consider how closely
the effects of, for example, in-person reporting requirements resemble the
effects of parole and probation in order to determine more accurately whether
the challenged law functions to punish.
Lastly, the “affirmative disability or restraint” inquiry should require
consideration of both physical and nonphysical restrictions. Particularly in
the context of sex offender legislation, review of the nonphysical restraints
placed on registrants is vital to fully assess the punitive nature of the burdens
imposed. Courts must consider how modern laws, notably those containing
residency restrictions, in-person reporting requirements, and GPS tracking
provisions, affect registrants’ freedom even when they are not physically
restrained.

331. See supra Part III.B.1.
332. See supra Part II.A.
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CONCLUSION
The expansion of sex offender legislation over the last ten years and the
legal challenges waged in response highlight the difficulty of affixing civil
or criminal labels to laws. It is not surprising then that federal courts, in
grappling with the existing punishment test, have disagreed on how to
properly demarcate the distinction between civil regulation and criminal
punishment—particularly as legislatures continue to push the limits of the
civil-criminal divide. This emerging circuit split emphasizes the need for the
Supreme Court to clarify the punishment test and affirm the constitutional
protections reserved for all people, even those society has deemed least
deserving of protection.

